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ABSTRACT

This research examines the Mississippi Wireless Information Network (MSWIN) and its
level of preparedness to avert the communication problems for the State of Mississippi that were
seen during Hurricane Katrina in 2005, in the event of a similar crisis. It explores the technical
workings of the network and the makeup of the Mississippi Wireless Communication
Commission (WCC) who oversees MSWIN. It also takes a look at similar networks in Louisiana
and Arkansas to compare and contrast those to what is in Mississippi. Primary interviews with
the WCC, State of Mississippi officials, and others on the Mississippi Gulf Coast paint a picture
of the current status of MSWIN and sentiment around the state on its existence. Funding,
barriers-to-entry, and the public-private partnership that make it work are part of the research.
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STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM
Hurricane Katrina was one of the worst natural disasters in the history of the United
States as ranked by costs in dollars and lives lost.1 When it made landfall on the morning of
Monday, August 29, 2005, near the Mississippi and Louisiana border it was a Category 3
hurricane with maximum winds estimated at 120 miles per hour (mph).2 As it pushed its way
north through Mississippi it was still categorized as a hurricane as far north as Meridian, MS,
which is over 150 miles off the Mississippi Gulf Coast.3
According to the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA), nationally
Hurricane Katrina was responsible for 1,833 deaths with a damage cost of $108 billion.4
Mississippi accounted for 238 of those fatalities.5
Thoughts of Hurricane Camille, which battered the Mississippi Gulf Coast in 1969, have
long been at the forefront of Mississippians’ minds as a benchmark of hurricane destruction.
While Hurricane Camille outranks Hurricane Katrina as a Category 5 hurricane when it made
landfall, it only killed about one-tenth of the people.6 Hurricane Katrina’s most destructive
winds reached almost 30 miles from its center—three times the radius of Hurricane Camille’s

1

"Hurricane Katrina - A Look Back 10 Years Later." National Weather Service. N.p., 17 Aug. 2015. Web. 1 June
2016.
2
Ibid
3
Katrina Ten Years After: Recovery, Rebuilding, and Renewal. Rep. Jackson: Office of Governor Phil Bryant,
2015. Print.
4
"Hurricane Katrina - A Look Back 10 Years Later." National Weather Service. N.p., 17 Aug. 2015. Web. 1 June
2016.
5
Katrina Ten Years After: Recovery, Rebuilding, and Renewal. Rep. Jackson: Office of Governor Phil Bryant,
2015. Print.
6
"Hurricanes in History." Hurricanes in History. National Hurricane Center, n.d. Web. 04 June 2016.
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most damaging winds.7 All 82 Mississippi counties were declared federal disaster areas and 74
counties received full federal assistance.8
The swath of Mississippians who were affected in Hurricane Katrina’s wake is just one of
countless reasons that citizens from all over the state have their own tales of just how the storm
affected them. Many of the Gulf Coast residents lost everything, but thousands of others were
also touched by the power of the storm. Eight out of every 10 people living in Mississippi lost
electricity when Hurricane Katrina hit and hundreds of thousands of homes were damaged.9
Over 5,000 rescues were performed in Mississippi.10 The State Emergency Operations
Center housed a missing person hotline in the days after Hurricane Katrina and it received more
than 11,000 phone calls from 40 different countries.11
When the final count was tallied, over 60,000 homes were destroyed in the state, which
left over 100,000 Mississippians without a place to live.12 That equated to a little over three
percent of the state’s population becoming homeless in the span of 24 hours.
Hurricane Katrina didn’t discriminate on what it destroyed and what it spared as it pushed
through Mississippi. Private homes, government buildings, and infrastructure all sustained major
damage, especially in the three coastal counties of Hancock, Harrison, and Jackson. State and
local governments had difficulties in the immediate hours and days after landfall with how to
communicate effectively with each other.

7

Katrina Ten Years After: Recovery, Rebuilding, and Renewal. Rep. Jackson: Office of Governor Phil Bryant,
2015. Print.
8
"Mississippi Marks Eight Years of Recovery since Hurricane Katrina." Mississippi’s 64th Governor Phil Bryant
RSS. Office of Governor Phil Bryant, 29 Aug. 2013. Web. 04 June 2016.
9
Katrina Ten Years After: Recovery, Rebuilding, and Renewal. Rep. Jackson: Office of Governor Phil Bryant,
2015. Print.
10
Ibid
11
Ibid
12
Ibid
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Even before the storm hit, the Mississippi Emergency Management Agency (MEMA)
was preparing for potential landfall and communicating daily with local, county emergency
directors.13 On August 23, 2005, six days before landfall, MEMA began publishing daily
situation reports and two days later held an executive planning meeting to prepare for Hurricane
Katrina.14 The next day Gov. Haley Barbour signed a State of Emergency order and a briefing
was held for all state agencies and Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) liaisons.15
With the State Emergency Operations Center (SEOC) activating on August 26, 2005, it was the
first use of a joint-federal unified command in a major disaster.16
As Hurricane Katrina’s 120 mph winds pummeled the Mississippi Gulf Coast, much of
the infrastructure in the immediate vicinity of the coastline was destroyed and the
communications infrastructure wasn’t immune. This includes landlines, cell phones towers, and
county emergency communication radio towers. Around 2,000 cellular towers were knocked out
by the storm nationally.17
The communication situation immediately following Hurricane Katrina in Mississippi
was summed up by Robert Latham, MEMA Executive Director in 2005, in the United States
House of Representatives 2006 final report detailing preparation and response for Hurricane
Katrina.

13

Ibid
Ibid
15
Ibid
16
Ibid
17
Testimony, Dr. Peter Fonash, Deputy Manager, National Communications System, before the House Committee
on Homeland Security, Oct. 26, 2005.
14
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In the report he stated, “the entire communications infrastructure of the state’s Gulf Coast was
destroyed by Hurricane Katrina, systems elsewhere across the state were inoperable, and those
systems that were working were overloaded, resulting in delays processing local governments’
requests for assistance.”18
Latham further explained in 2016 the severity of the problem saying, “When we got to
Harrison County on Tuesday afternoon we didn’t know how bad it was in Hancock County. We
didn’t have any communications from [them]. Other than early on Monday morning we had
gotten a report that the roof of the Hancock County Emergency Operations Center (EOC) had
collapsed. I had already pulled MEMA staffers out and sent them to the Stennis Space Center in
the preliminary, because it was safer. We thought that everyone had perished in that EOC, but
we came to find out that nobody did.
“I would write questions that I needed answers to on a notecard and put somebody in a
car, send them to Hancock County, and say, “I need answers to this.” That’s how we were
communicating.”19
Brian Adam, the Hancock County EMA Director in 2005, who is still in that position today,
said it was about four days until their local, terrestrial emergency radio system used by the county
was repaired enough to start using it again in some capacity. Additionally, it was about a week
before he could use a cell phone in the area. The only means of communication they had was a
ham radio that a local radio station operator had brought to the EOC office before the storm hit
because he was going to ride the storm out with them.20

18

A Failure of Initiative: Final Report of the Select Bipartisan Committee to Investigate the Preparation for and
Response to Hurricane Katrina. Rep. Washington D.C.: U.S. House of Representatives, 2006. Print.
19
"Robert Latham Interview." Personal interview. 1 Aug. 2016.
20
"Brian Adam Interview." Telephone interview. 31 Aug. 2016.
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“In about 40 or 50 mph winds he climbed up the tower [on top of the office] to straighten
up the antenna for the ham radio and that was the only communication we had,” Adam stated. “It
was some time before he was able to contact someone from the state—maybe a day or so. It was
a little while.”21
Joe Spraggins, the former Harrison County EMA Director in 2005, echoed much of the
same sentiments. He was able to use his cell phone to text shortly after the storm moved through
but that didn’t last long.
“The landlines went down in the storm and our cell phones towers were extremely saturated,
but they only [worked for] about 8 hours,” he said. “The cell phones basically stopped working
because the towers died. Some towers had generators but they ran out of fuel.”22
There was one system that Harrison County utilized with success although it wasn’t as
practical. It involved them having to travel a distance, which was tough immediately after the
storm.
“One system that never failed us is the Defense Systems Network. The military had
communications with each other that were not on regular telephone lines—it’s fiber optics. You
could call base-to-base only though,” Spraggins said. “So we could go to the Air Guard Base or
Kessler Air Force Base and utilize that telephone to call the Guard Base in Jackson and we could
get patched through to another land line if they had the capability. As far as I know, it never went
down.”23

21

Ibid
"Joe Spraggins Interview." Telephone interview. 15 Aug. 2016.
23
Ibid
22
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In the only other oceanfront county in Mississippi, Jackson County, Butch Loper, local
EMA Director in 2005, remembered not being able to communicate outside of Jackson County
post-landfall.
“The only thing we could get outside of Jackson County very successfully was ham radio.
Cell phones were dead.”24
He explained their local push-to-talk radios, that were subscription-based only, were
effective for their employees in the county but that was only a fraction of the people working inside
their borders.
“If the other person didn’t have that [subscription] you couldn’t talk to them,” he said.25
The local, terrestrial emergency radio system in Jackson County went into failsafe-mode
because of the damage sustained to the towers and a couple of generators going out.
“You had everybody in the world talking on one channel,” Loper stated explaining that
failsafe-mode caused that to happen.26
Local Sun Herald newspaper reporter in 2005, Melissa Scallan, remembers the
communication crisis also affected the media’s ability to get information and plan logistics.
“Our news team would meet every afternoon in person to decide what we were going to do
the next day,” Scallan said. “Because the phone service was not good, the landlines were down,
and we didn’t have electricity to charge cell phones—the service was spotty.
“I was able to actually talk to my family on Thursday by cell phone. There wasn’t social
media at the time so all we had was the phones,” she stated. It took four days after landfall before
Scallan was able to speak by phone to her family to let them know she was safe.

24

"Butch Loper Interview." Telephone interview. 15 Aug. 2016.
Ibid
26
Ibid
25
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Stories like these weren’t only a problem in Mississippi though. The State of Louisiana
suffered the exact same fate when it came to communication systems breaking down. In the
Times Picayune Gov. Kathleen Blanco said, “The big problem [in managing disaster response]
was that the communications network was down. The day after the storm, cell phones,
blackberries, and landlines were useless at the moment when coordination among many branches
of government was critical.”27
The federal government was in agreement two months after the storm hit when Paul
McHale, the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense, testified to the United States
Congress on October 27, 2005, and said, “The magnitude of the storm was such that the local
communications system wasn’t simply degraded; it was, at least for a period of time,
destroyed.”28
At a very macro-level view, the crisis communications problem for the State of
Mississippi was two-fold immediately after Hurricane Katrina swept through the state. The first
was the lack of ability to communicate with each other, between state agencies and first
responders, and secondly it was how to communicate with persons affected that were suffering
their own problems all over the state.
It’s easy to forget the extent of damage that happened above the lower-three counties, but
they weren’t the only ones in bad situations. Had there been a perfect communication plan from
the State of Mississippi, there were still people everywhere that wouldn’t have been able to
receive it. Power was out to 80 percent of the state, coastal cell phones towers were failing, and
social media was in its infancy.

27

Maggi, L. (2005, September 12). Lack of communication proved crippling: Rescue, safety, recovery efforts were
hindered. Times-Picayune (New Orleans), p. A10.
28
Hurricane Katrina: Preparedness and Response by the Department of Defense, the Coast Guard, and the National
Guard of Louisiana, Mississippi, and Alabama (2005) (testimony of Paul McHale). Print.
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Twitter didn’t launch until March 2006 and, as mentioned, Facebook wasn’t open to the
general public until September 2006.2930 So the lack of arguably two of the most useful social
media networks during any crisis did not exist to the vast majority of the public when Hurricane
Katrina hit. The State of Mississippi obviously couldn’t control that, but it’s a cruel circumstance
that two of the dominant social networks in the world launched just one year after landfall.
Furthermore, in October 2005, Director of the Office of Homeland Security Kenneth
Moran testified to Congress that over 100 commercial radio stations were forced off the air due to
Hurricane Katrina damages.31
Ironically, just four months before Hurricane Katrina made landfall in August 2005, the
State of Mississippi committed to build a brand new statewide interoperable public safety radio
system, which is now known as the Mississippi Wireless Information Network (MSWIN). 32
Mississippi Gov. Haley Barbour signed legislation in April 2005, to create the Mississippi Wireless
Communication Commission (WCC) to oversee public safety emergency communications, which
included MSWIN. 33 At its core, MSWIN is a public safety communication system with a
collection of 144 towers sites across Mississippi that provides users coverage within 97 percent of
the state’s border.34 Users on MSWIN can talk to each other by radio statewide on a common
platform regardless of their municipality, agency, or location.
The idea to try and remedy what ultimately occurred with communication systems on the
Gulf Coast due to Hurricane Katrina had been put into motion by the State of Mississippi, but it

29

Arrington, Michael. "Facebook Just Launched Open Registrations." Tech Crunch. N.p., 26 Sept. 2006. Web. 04
June 2016.
30
Bilton, Nick. Hatching Twitter., Chapter II, Section Twitter, Pages 61-64
31
Testimony, Kenneth Moran, Director, Office of Homeland Security, Federal Communications Commission,
before the House Committee on Homeland Security, Oct. 26, 2005.
32
The Evolution of Public Safety Radio Communications in Mississippi. Rep. Jackson: Mississippi Wireless
Communication Commission, 2016. Print.
33
Ibid
34
"MSWIN." Mississippi Wireless Communication Commission, n.d. Web. 27 Sept. 2016.
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would be years before it was operational. The WCC had only one organizational meeting before
Hurricane Katrina hit the Gulf Coast, and MSWIN wasn’t operational until 2009, according to Bill
Buffington, WCC Technical Director. 35 MSWIN wouldn’t become operational statewide until
2013.36
Buffington remembers back to 2005 when he was explaining the need for a MSWIN-type
system in Mississippi saying, “In the private sector, I was trying to convince leadership types,
starting at the county level, of the need for a universal emergency communications system.
Everything was fragmented. What Katrina did do is it made leadership, at all levels, aware of the
lack of emergency communications.” 37 Buffington went on to say, “The Katrina experience
demonstrated for the leadership that they needed a consolidated, universal platform. So that any
agency, state or local, can do their business and keep up with one another in the event of an
emergency. MSWIN was tasked with creating a concept of what kind of technology can work, in
the public safety realm, for all responding-type agencies.”38
To recap the difficulties on the Mississippi Gulf Coast, some satellite phones didn’t work
because the dishes were blown off roofs, cell phone towers were blown over or damaged, cell
phone towers that weren’t damaged lost power and only had a few days of fuel for the generators,
telephone lines were down, the Internet was down, cell phones couldn’t be charged because the
power was down, and it didn’t matter because many of the towers that were up were overloaded
from capacity or dead within hours. Furthermore, first responders coming into the area didn’t have
a centralized emergency communication system they were all singularly able to use to
communicate with each other anyway.

35

"Bill Buffington Interview." Personal interview. 4 Aug. 2016.
Ibid
37
Ibid
38
Ibid
36
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These are a few of the ways that various people explained why they were stuck in time, cut off
from what would have been helpful information or logistically moving lifesaving pieces of the
recovery puzzle into place.
Fast forwarding to present day, the MSWIN system has been tasked and billed as a remedy
for many of the problems that occurred in 2005. For destructive storms, it sounds like a silver
bullet for numerous emergency-related communications problems.
But in Mississippi, MSWIN does have its detractors. Locals not wanting the state to control
their communications, high costs of equipment, the scare of potential user fees, and more are
factors described by local municipalities in this research as to they were or are hesitant to join the
system. What does that mean for their citizens?
This thesis and its subsequent research will dive into MSWIN and attempt to uncover the
intricacies that are facilitating or hindering its overall mission. For those that are already on
MSWIN it looks at the training, or lack thereof, for users. What do supporters and detractors have
to say about the system? What are the barriers to entry that make municipalities hesitant to join?
Is state-funding a problem for MSWIN operations? What vendor(s) upkeep the system and how
were they chosen? How does the MSWIN system compare to others across the country that have
been implemented, or not implemented, since Hurricane Katrina? This thesis will attempt to
answers these questions.

10

LITERATURE REVIEW
"Any time we have an emergency situation or disaster, communication is always our
weakest link, especially when it comes to speaking across county lines and up to the state," said
Warren County New Jersey Public Safety Director Frank Wheatley, who was in charge
answering 911 calls and organizing emergency responses. "This is when that type of
communication is so important in terms of incident command and interoperability. Being able to
communicate across all lines and barriers is paramount."39
This sounds almost identical to Hurricane Katrina reports that were published in its
aftermath. Wheatley was referencing the biggest problem state and local officials have in New
Jersey when an emergency situation occurs. Hurricane Sandy was another case study in
emergency communications for the nation.
The purpose of this literature review is to focus on the communication failures and
successes from Hurricane Sandy in New Jersey and Hurricane Gustav in Louisiana to provide
context for what occurred in Mississippi with Hurricane Katrina in 2005.
Hurricane Sandy
Hurricane Sandy made landfall on October 29, 2012, near Atlantic City, N.J., with winds
around 80 mph.40 In total, at least 149 people were killed from the storm including 81 from the
United States.41 Much like Hurricane Katrina, the winds from Hurricane Sandy reached

39

Bultman, Matthew. "Emergency Radios given to Counties, Addressing 'weakest Link' in Disaster Situations."
Lehigh Valley Live. N.p., 8 Sept. 2013. Web. 4 Oct. 2016.
40
Sharp, Tim. "Superstorm Sandy: Facts About the Frankenstorm." LiveScience. TechMedia Network, 27 Nov.
2012. Web. 04 Oct. 2016.
41
Ibid
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extremely far from the center of the storm causing a huge swath of destruction. Hurricane force
winds extended up to 175 miles from its core. On the night that it hit, a full moon caused high
tides to be 20 percent higher than normal, which caused immense flooding in subway tunnels and
covered many electrical systems.42
The day after landfall 7.9 million businesses and households were without electrical
power.43 Just like Hurricane Katrina, the infrastructure had major failures that caused trouble for
many citizens.
“The data we received soon after the storm indicated that approximately 25 percent of
cell sites and cable services in the affected 10-state area were not operational,” said FCC
Chairman Julius Genachowski in February 2013. “Of course those figures were much greater in
hard-hit areas of New York and New Jersey.”44 Genachowski was giving remarks at a Hurricane
Sandy Field Hearing where communication experts had gathered.
“In addition to illustrating the essential role of communications services, this
unprecedented storm also revealed challenges that require a national dialogue on how to ensure
the resiliency of communications networks – and action to address communications outages and
the need for resilient communications networks,” he went on to say.45
In regards to the power outages and cell phone towers, the New York Times reported in
February 2013, “Many towers had no power and their backup battery systems were soon
exhausted. Carriers used generators for power, but eventually those required more fuel —
another limited resource.”46

42

Ibid
"Hurricane Sandy Fast Facts." CNN. Cable News Network, 3 Oct. 2015. Web. 04 Oct. 2016.
44
Genachowski, Julius. Superstorm Sandy Field Hearing. New York, NY. 5 Feb. 2013. Speech.
45
Ibid
46
Chen, Brian X. "F.C.C. Seeks Ways to Keep Phones Alive in a Storm." New York Times, 5 Feb. 2013. Web. 4
Oct. 2016.

43
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The vast power outages had knocked out cell phone service for all of the big networks in
the Northeast, the articled stated. The same mistakes of not having enough fuel for generators for
some cell phone towers was also seen seven years earlier during Hurricane Katrina causing
operable towers to fail during crucial times.
Much of the ire of the news media and government officials in the months after
Hurricane Sandy was focused on the cell phone companies and their networks being inoperable
after the storm. While there were certainly problems during Hurricane Katrina with cell phone
coverage, there were also across-the-board problems of citizens, government officials, and
emergency responders not being able to communicate.
“It was easy to contact government officials using radio devices but impossible to contact
a phone carrier,” said Jack Schnirman, city manager of Long Beach, N.Y., after wireless service
went down in his city. “The lack of communication and response from service providers was
extremely disconcerting.”47
The New York City Hurricane Sandy After Action Report summed up the situation with
cell phone networks saying:
The 14-foot storm surge at the Battery and the inundation of Lower Manhattan badly
damaged Verizon’s major telephone infrastructure hubs, called central offices (COs), and
high winds and water brought down overhead lines across residential sections of the City.
Power outages exacerbated poor service as cellular towers, which are dependent on
commercial power and are not required to have backup power, shut down, leaving many
parts of the five boroughs without landline, wireless, or internet services for several days.
In places where network sites did remain fully operable, some users could not receive
service due to overload conditions from a high volume of call traffic.48
Once again, this was déjà vu of seven years earlier on the Mississippi Gulf Coast with
Hurricane Katrina.

47

Ibid
New York City Hurricane Sandy After Action Report. Rep. New York City: New York City Mayor's Office, 2013.
Print.

48
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Less than 10 days after Hurricane Sandy made landfall, it was already apparent that the
public-safety communications had fared better than the cell phone networks. Urgent
Communications reported, “Early indications from state departments of transportation indicate
that public-safety agencies in the affected area have been able to maintain communications in the
aftermath of Sandy, according to William Brownlow, telecommunications manager for the
American Association of State Highway and Transportation Officials (AASHTO).”49
Brownlow said during the interview that, “The general takeaway from this is that public
safety’s requirements are not the same as commercial providers—the need for backup generators
is absolutely crucial.”50 He attributed the public-safety communication systems remaining intact,
from input he received from New York and New Hampshire, because the tower sites had been
hardened to withstand such conditions and had generators as backup.
This was one distinct difference from Hurricane Katrina in that major population areas
during Hurricane Sandy, like New York City, public-safety communications remained operable
for the most part.51 This allowed officers to respond to calls more efficiently, and it certain
instances, where time was of the essence for citizens. "They [officers] start responding to these
areas as the calls came in, they were in police cars where the water was up to the tire. They'd go
into a building to get somebody out, and as soon as they came out, the water was up to the
window of the car,” said Charles Dowd, a deputy chief for the New York Police Department
during an interview with Urgent Communications.52

49

Jackson, Donny. "Public-safety Communications Fare Better than Commercial Networks after Superstorm
Sandy." Urgent Communications, 6 Nov. 2012. Web. 4 Oct. 2016.
50
Ibid
51
Jackson, Donny. "NYPD's Dowd: Sandy 'came in like a Tsunami'" Urgent Communications, 13 Nov. 2012. Web.
4 Oct. 2016.
52
Ibid
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"Both the police and fire systems stayed up 100 percent of the time," he said. "We lost a
couple of receiver sites temporarily, but those were receiver sites mixed with another receiver
site, so there was no degradation in the system. We did not lose a single frequency on the police
or fire side the entire time.”53
Congressman Donald Payne, Jr., representing New Jersey’s 10th district, reiterated that
communication between first responders was much improved during Hurricane Sandy from what
it was during the 9/11 attacks in New York City.
“In the years since 9/11, the Federal government – along with state and local
governments–has made significant investments toward achieving interoperability,” Payne said
during a 2013 Subcommittee Hearing on Emergency Preparedness, Response, and
Communications.54
“During the Hurricane Sandy response, we saw improvement in cross-discipline
communication. Police officers were able to communicate with firefighters across New York and
with officials in New Jersey closing airports,” Payne stated. “However, cross-jurisdiction
communications challenges were evident. Specifically, emergency officials that came to provide
mutual aid could not communicate with local first responders on their own radios.”55 In essence,
they couldn’t communicate if they were from out of the region like many emergency responders
were when they came to Mississippi from out of state to assist with Hurricane Katrina. If each
state is working as a silo on becoming interoperable on their own system, that doesn’t necessarily
account for responders coming in from out of state. Mississippi has combated that to a degree

53

Ibid
Opening Statement of Ranking Member Donald M. Payne, Jr. Publication. United States Congress,
SUBCOMMITTEE ON EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS, RESPONSE, AND COMMUNICATIONS, 18 Nov.
2014. Web. 5 Oct. 2016.
55
Ibid

54

15

with the P-25 radios they have chosen to use on MSWIN. If any emergency responder has this
grade of radio they can connect to the network. This will be discussed later in the thesis.
Hurricane Gustav
Hurricane Gustav made landfall as a Category 2 hurricane near Cocodrie, LA, with winds
near 105 mph on September 1, 2008, almost three years to the day after Hurricane Katrina.
During its lifespan, the Hurricane Gustav is credited with 153 deaths in total throughout the
Caribbean and mainland United States. Baton Rouge was one of the hardest hit areas of
Louisiana, lying just north of Cocodrie. The town was shut down for several days and it took
almost four months to clean up debris from the storm.56
The city of New Orleans didn’t see the type of impact from Hurricane Gustav as it did
from Hurricane Katrina, but there was still flooding and wind damage in the city. Taking no
chances this time, New Orleans Mayor Ray Nagin ordered a mandatory evacuation of the entire
city two days before landfall on August 30. New Orleans residents, along with many others from
southern Louisiana that left their homes, constituted the largest evacuation in the state’s history
with 1.9 million people fleeing the oncoming storm.57
The largest hindrance to communication during the immediate hours and days after
Hurricane Gustav was the Louisiana power grid owned and run by Entergy Corp. failed in a
large way. More than 828,000 homes and businesses lost power during the storm, and in New
Orleans only one of 14 transmission lines connecting the city to the rest of the state’s power grid
was left functioning.58 The Times-Picayune reported that Baton Rouge was without power for a
week.

56

"2008-Hurricane Gustav." Hurricane Science. N.p., n.d. Web. 5 Oct. 2016.
Ibid
58
Mowbray, Rebecca. "Some Blame Grid, Not Gustav, for Power Outages." Nola.com. The Times-Picayune, 4 Oct.
2008. Web. 5 Oct. 2016.
57
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“We are concerned that so much of the power for southeast Louisiana was dependent on
just a few lines. It showed how vulnerable the system is,” former Louisiana Gov. Bobby Jindal
said. “Clearly we need more redundancy in the state.”59
The Louisiana Energy and Power Authority, an association of 18 towns that ran their own
utilities, came down even harder on Entergy stating in October 2008, “Entergy has one of the
weakest designed transmission systems in the country in terms of redundancy, although it is in an
area where everyone should plan for hurricanes.”60
Because of widespread power outages, some cell phone towers and Internet connections
inevitably went down in parts of Louisiana, but compared to Hurricane Katrina three years
earlier, the effects on citizens and emergency responders was much less.61 Two primary cables
that powered AT&T Inc. customers in New Orleans went down during the height of the storm
delaying the ability to make calls until the next afternoon.62
Only one day after the storm, AT&T said that most of their cell towers in the area hit by
the storm were working. Verizon Wireless also stated that less than one percent of their cell
towers in areas hit were offline, mainly due to power outages. T-Mobile USA echoed the same
sentiments attributing small network disruptions to power outages in the state.63 This is contrast
to the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina and played a part in many citizens and first responders not
having at least one of the major problems they experienced in 2005 in Mississippi.
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AT&T and Verizon were successful in using a combination of battery and generator
power to keep switching stations that routed cell phones calls up and running while much of the
state’s power grid was down. AT&T estimated they were using around 85,000 gallons of diesel
fuel a day to run wireless cell sites, central offices, and remote terminals.64
A spokesman for the Louisiana State Police, State Trooper Joseph Piglia, said
communication among the Louisiana agencies was fluid, according to The Times-Picayune.
The paper also reported, “Another key improvement to the New Orleans Police Department
response came in the area of radio communications. Police radio traffic and dispatches broke
down in Katrina, leaving officers operating in isolated pockets, without orders or coordination.
But few problems with communications emerged during Gustav.”65
New Orleans public safety agencies created a joint information center where they were
able to brief the public regularly during Hurricane Gustav.66
The most important factor in communication successes for Louisiana, other than the
severity of the storm not being as bad, was the creation of the Louisiana Wireless Network
(LWIN) in 2006. It is described as very similar in nature to MSWIN.
In 2012, the FCC described the LWIN as follows during a docket hearing, “In 2006,
Louisiana created a Statewide Interoperability Executive Committee (SIEC) to establish and
administer a statewide shared communication system to help protect life and property in the
state, which is particularly vulnerable to potentially disastrous weather events. The SIEC is
comprised of twenty voting members, fifteen of whom are representatives of local and first
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responder associations. The SIEC provides governance and oversees the development and
maintenance of the Louisiana Wireless Network.”67 This member structure will be discussed
more later in the thesis where the LWIN and MSWIN are compared.
The docket transcript explains the success LWIN had with Hurricane Gustav saying,
“LWIN has enabled Louisiana to achieve a high level of interoperability among participating
jurisdictions. In anticipation of 2008’s Hurricane Gustav, for example, Louisiana used LWIN to
support evacuation of almost its entire coastline, and the LWIN system accommodated over six
million separate push-to-talk communications during a 10-day period.”68
LWIN helped to facilitate the largest evacuation in the history of the state of Louisiana,
as mentioned earlier.
While it’s not entirely possible to compare their subsequent communication failures and
successes apples-to-apples due to varying degrees of damage caused, it’s apparent that some
failures seen during Hurricane Katrina were replayed again during both Hurricane Sandy and
Hurricane Gustav. On the other side of the coin, Louisiana’s creation of the LWIN seemingly
proved invaluable to moving human lives out of the way of another oncoming storm only three
years later.
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METHODOLOGY
The method of research that will be used in this thesis is qualitative in nature and will
mainly be accomplished through primary source interviews. Individuals will be interviewed from
the Mississippi Wireless Communications Commission, Mississippi Emergency Management
Agency, Mississippi Gulf Coast local emergency management agency directors from past and
present, and also representatives from the cellular networks of C Spire and AT&T. Furthermore,
other third party individuals like telecommunications Professor Jon Peha of Carnegie Mellon
University will be interviewed. Peha has also served as the FCC’s Chief Technology Officer
from 2008-2010 and been a White House technology policy advisor.
These people have direct knowledge and/or experience from 2005 when Hurricane
Katrina hit. Some of them also have current knowledge and/or experience as to what solutions
are or are not in place. For some, they will have both traits, having been there 11 years ago and
still being in a relevant position.
The individuals listed below and others will be interviewed about their experiences and/or
knowledge relating to MSWIN and Hurricane Katrina’s communication crisis for this thesis:
•

Robert Latham—Former MEMA Director during Hurricane Katrina

•

Lee Smithson—Current MEMA Director

•

Vicki Helfrich—Mississippi Wireless Communications Commission Executive Director

•

Bill Buffington—Mississippi Wireless Communications Commission Technical Director

•

Butch Loper—Former Jackson County Emergency Management Agency Director

•

Earl Eathridge—Current Jackson County Emergency Management Agency Director
20

•

Rupert Lacy—Current Harrison County Emergency Management Agency Director

•

Joe Spraggins—Former Harrison County Emergency Management Agency Director

•

Brian Adam—Former and current Hancock County Emergency Management Agency
Director

•

C Spire—Multiple former and current senior level directors

•

AT&T Mississippi—Bill Harris, AT&T executive director of external and regulatory
affairs

•

Jon Peha—Telecommunications Professor at Carnegie Mellon University and former
FCC Chief Technology Officer

•

Penny Rubow, Arkansas Wireless Information Network Program Director

•

Travis Johnson, Louisiana Interoperability Program Manager

Additionally, to compare MSWIN to other statewide emergency network systems in place
around the country, interviews and case study research has been done, as seen in the literature
review. Two of the case studies were Hurricane Sandy in New Jersey and Hurricane Gustav in
Louisiana. There is also a section of the research that will focus solely on other statewide
networks around the country to see what is out there, outside of case study analysis.
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HOW DOES THE MSWIN WORK?
MSWIN is a public safety communication system with a collection of 144 tower sites
across Mississippi that provides users coverage within 97 percent of the state’s border.69 Users
on MSWIN can talk to each other by radio statewide on a common platform regardless of their
municipality, agency, or location. According to WCC Executive Director Vicki Helfrich, the
system has the capacity to support 128,000 users and is monitored 24 hours a day, 365 days a
year by the WCC. [Each tower site is] furnished with equipment shelters, emergency power
systems, network equipment, redundant site controllers, and dual battery backup recovery
systems.
In regards to the actual technical portion of the network, WCC Technical Director Bill
Buffington explained, “The backbone of this whole system is a microwave, multi-loop
configuration. So we don’t depend on the public switch telephone network. That’s because of
lessons we learned during Hurricane Katrina. Not only do we not rely on cellphones anymore,
but we don’t use landlines either. We have a self-contained network.”70 The network is
completely terrestrial and uses no satellites. A terrestrial network “uses land-based antennas and
antenna systems for two-way radios, cellular telephones, personal communication systems
(PCS), and microwave applications.”71
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The network is not only used during emergencies. The WCC has created 40 Special
Event Talk Groups that are used frequently for any number of cross-jurisdictional events.72 The
WCC requires these 40 channels to be programed into every MSWIN-capable radio in the state.
An example of a non-emergency use of the network would be a local police officer escorting a
football team five counties away for a Friday night football game and the WCC assigns them one
of the 40 channels during non-emergency times to let them use it to communicate across
jurisdictional lines for a matter of convenience and practicality.73
MEMA also uses the MSWIN quite regularly during non-emergency times. Current
MEMA Director Lee Smithson said, “We use MSWIN a lot for our own internal
communications. That’s what we use on a daily basis to communicate with our people out in the
field. On any given day, we have around 100 people in the field, depending on what’s going on.
So that is our primary method of communications, at the tactical level, in the agency.”74
In the past, first responders like police or fire departments that were one county over from
each other might not have been able to talk to each other because each county used a separate,
terrestrial radio system that their respective county set up and maintained. This caused a siloeffect among many neighboring agencies. So conceivably there could be multiple jurisdictions
responding to an emergency yet they could only talk amongst their own departments. Cleveland
Police Chief Buster Bingham kept multiple radios in his patrol car to be able to communicate
with neighboring agencies before his department joined the MSWIN.75
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This type of problem was seen during and immediately after Hurricane Katrina because,
for the most part in the midst of the massive disaster, local responders couldn’t speak to each
other unless they were from the same county. Robert Latham, MEMA Director in 2005, said,
“Across the coast, and across the entire state in fact, it was a patchwork of systems.”76
Latham said there was only thing in place in 2005 to overcome that problem. “We bought
a system called an ACU 1000 [after the 9/11 attacks], which was a device that you could hook up
to any radio system and would allow it to talk to any other radio system. We bought one for
every county. The problem was that some counties put them in a closet and never installed
them,” he said.77
The towers of each local, terrestrial system for each county were knocked down in large
part and cell phones towers had the same issues. “So we had done everything that we thought we
could do, in terms of communications,” Latham said. “I don’t know if we ever could have
imagined a total collapse of the system state-wide. But that’s what we had. A total collapse of the
system, because we lost all of our towers.”78
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Figure 1. MSWIN Coverage Map
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MSWIN TOWERS AND RADIOS
To prevent such a “total collapse of the system” again, the WCC has set parameters for
all 144 towers that they are in charge of maintaining. In fact, the WCC is bound by legislation to
upkeep the MSWIN infrastructure.79 Each of the towers is “hardened” to make them stronger
than an average tower to prevent them from sustaining damage during bad weather. The tower
sites are fortified to withstand emergency weather situations, have emergency power, and are off
the ground, according to WCC. 165 mph is the wind-load that they are built to withstand. The
wind-loads change as you move away from the coast. “The one thing Katrina taught us is that
you can never say never with certainty, but they should survive if another Katrina-type event
occurred,” said Buffington.80 As a measuring stick, hurricanes become classified as Category 5
when their wind speed reaches 157 mph.
“There is no place in the state where one tower site stands by itself. Everything is
overlapped,” Buffington explained. “So you may not be able to speak from this specific spot, but
maybe you move a quarter mile and that works. Everything is overlapped, redundant, and very
survivable. Everything has back-up power, generators and an uninterruptable power supply
(UPS). Basically a battery that is inverted to AC power.”81
It was documented that some cellular network generators on the Mississippi Gulf Coast
ran out of fuel to power them rendering them useless, even though they were still standing. To
overcome that problem he explained, “We don’t move generators like your phone carriers. Every
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MSWIN site is hardened and has back-up power along with 1,000 gallons of propane, which
we’ve seen last for more than three weeks. The second line of power after the power grid is the
UPS which starts the generator that is powered by propane. All of the propane is lifted
[vertically] to protect it from flooding as well.”82
Connecting to the towers are the 30,000 individual radios that are around the state right
now—each having their own radio I.D. Buffington expounded saying, “There are around 40
state agencies, 20 federal agencies, and over 400 local entities [on MSWIN]. Every county is
different, so that’s why we say over 400 local entities.”83
He explained that the WCC decided early in the process of building out the MSWIN that
the radios would be standard-based and they wouldn’t try to integrate with existing radio systems
that locals already had. The main logic behind that was there was no standard-based system
where all the radios had to be set to a certain standard of technology or capability.84 Arguably,
not having those standards is what created the silo-effect that created problems for all of the local
radio networks.
The WCC decided to go with a universal, standards-based system that was uniform
across the board. “The biggest public safety organization in the country is APCO: American
Police Officer Communications Organization,” Buffington described. “They have their own
engineering people, and through the years there has been an evolution of technologies. And the
latest and greatest is P-25 (Phase-25). The whole concept of a P-25 system is that it should not be
vendor-specific for the equipment.”85
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This means that hardware like radios and console systems can be built and sold by
numerous companies, yet still all communicate seamlessly. Today, MSWIN has seven P-25
vendors that they have tested and cleared to be used on the network.86 Local agencies across the
state can buy from any of the vendors as they see fit to get onto the MSWIN system. “It is nonproprietary and open-standard, which means that we are not tied to one vendor for our
equipment,” Buffington said.87
Radios also fall into two categories: mobile and portable. Mobile radios are classified as
anything that is mounted or installed in a vehicle. Portable radios can be carried by hand or
placed on one’s body and taken into the field. The WCC says mobile radios have a 97 percent
coverage around Mississippi, as compared to portable radios that have 93 percent coverage. The
places in the state where coverage isn’t available usually due to the terrain like river bottoms or
low-lying areas. Both of the radios operate on a 700 MHz public safety spectrum.88

Figure 2. Motorola P25 Radio
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EXAMPLES OF MSWIN USE IN EMERGENCY SITUATIONS
MSWIN reached the statewide coverage it has now in 2013, and since that time there
have been several emergency responses that have been coordinating using it. The tornado
outbreak on April 28, 2014, across Mississippi killed over a dozen people.89 One of the hardest
hit areas was Winston County, where the Winston County Medical Center was destroyed, along
with hundreds of homes.90
Prior to the tornado hitting Winston County, their EMA staffers were given six MSWIN
radios to test out the system before they joined it.91 The first call from them for help, manpower,
and resources came on those MSWIN radios. In total, 16 agencies responded to the call, with
eight from the state and eight locally.92
“I had an appreciation for the capabilities of the MSWIN system prior to the disaster
itself,” Buddy King, Winston County EMA Director said. “To actually place this system into
service during our disaster affirmed my county’s commitment to converting our communications
system to a statewide system.”93
According to the WCC, the silo-effect of different agencies coming into the area was
present on the day after the storms with many of them not being able to communicate. Winston
County EMA requested 50 more MSWIN radios to be dispersed throughout the area to help
coordinate efforts and it was granted.
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The WCC assigned a Special Events Talk Group channel to responders in the region and they
were able to use it to plan relief efforts and whatever else was needed at the time.
About a year later on September 14, 2015, a professor killed another professor on the
campus of Delta State University (DSU) in Cleveland, MS.94 The Cleveland Police Department
was on the scene of the shooting within two minutes and Chief Buster Bingham sent out a call on
his MSWIN radio over the “state common channel” which is monitored by MEMA since the
university wasn’t on the system. DSU had actually ordered MSWIN radios that hadn’t arrived
yet when the shooting occurred.95 At the time, the City of Cleveland was the only municipality in
Bolivar County to be on MSWIN. Helfrich said, “They were one of the entities that showed up at
the commission and wanted to just do their own thing. We fought those people for two years.”96
Eventually, they indeed joined the network.
“Basically, he gets on the radio, and all these state responders hear. They're able to
communicate because they're using a special event channel and he said within five minutes they
had multiple agencies on campus,” described Helfrich. “Bolivar County wasn't on the system.
So, they had to partner them with people that had MSWIN radios.”97
“The response was tremendous. Within 45 minutes, we had around 250 to 300 officers on
the scene from all over Mississippi,” said Bingham.98
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MSWIN LACK OF TRAINING
Even with municipalities from every county in Mississippi on MSWIN there isn’t a
unified training program from the WCC or the State of Mississippi to train them on how to
actually use the system effectively. To put it plainly, Helfrich said, “We've been dependent on
agencies and entities to perform their own training, and it's not really occurring like it needs
to.”99
With all of the capabilities of MSWIN, ultimately in the face of an emergency it falls to
each of the 30,000 individuals who have radios around the state to know how to properly operate
their equipment. Each radio is much more complex than a simple push-to-talk style radio from
decades past. Buffington explained some examples of new radio features stating, “You have a
man-down button. Not necessarily on all of them. You have things like if you have a radio, and if
in the case if it’s a fireman's radio, if it doesn't move for some programmable set period of time,
it sends an alarm to his buddies in dispatch.” Additionally, some radios have encryption so news
media can't hear what is being said.100
“These people generally know how to push a button already and talk. So long as they're
operating in their world, they're okay,” said Buffington. “Where it hits the wall is on these
emergencies—multiple agency responses. And who declares, where do you go, which county
you go to, how do you talk, who coordinates it? We need more training. And those people, even
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when we've done training, and we have done training, but the personnel changes. You make
some progress, then you lose that progress.”101
Rapid response emergencies arguably are one of the top reasons for the MSWIN to exist
yet these situations are when there is the highest chance for a user-error due to the lack of
training. This fact isn’t lost on Smithson. “I’ll tell you right now you are not going to find a
bigger advocate of MSWIN than me,” he explained. “The problem with MSWIN was that, as we
rolled it out, we did not have a really fantastic education process. If you go talk to state agencies
like the Department of Public Safety, a road trooper, and you ask him about his mutual-aid
channels on his radio, half of them don’t know about them. They could tell you all about the
Department of Public Safety channels on that radio. But if you tell them to find a mutual-aid
channel to talk to MEMA or the coast they won’t know how to do it. The devices will do it, but
they have not been trained to know how to program them.”102
Smithson described a real world example of where this challenge has shown up during
field operations saying, “We did a search and rescue in Noxubee County when I was in the
National Guard. We had one of our UH-72 helicopters that’s got MSWIN radios in it. They don’t
have the MEMA channels programmed in there, because they’re not a part of MEMA. I was
talking to the area coordinator and telling her to tune her radio to one of the MEMA channels,
and she tells me ‘I don’t have those in my radio.’ I had to walk her through it.”103
Additionally, he explained another user that didn’t know how to operate the radio
properly stating, “I talked to a state trooper not too long ago and it was the same thing.
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He had a radio that Rankin County had given him to communicate to them, but didn’t know how
to communicate through MSWIN.”104
When Smithson was asked where the training was going to come from he said, “That’s
the $64,000 question. Vickie Helfrich and I talked about it. She’s got guys, and I have folks. We
got together in about April, and we put together a “Train the Trainer” program. Some of her
people are going around the state and training agencies on the MSWIN radios and how to
program them. You would be amazed at the number of people who won’t know that their radios
can do these things. The issue is that it’s so caveman-easy to operate that no one ever thought a
formal training would be necessary.”105
Helfrich added, “So we have been in the process of developing statewide training
programs. So, we've already begun a ‘Train the Trainer’ program, so we're basically having to
find volunteers who will agree to be trainers for the WCC. And we're trying to finalize the
training program, because we want it to be standardized.”106 She explained that the lack of staff
for MSWIN is a big factor in not having enough people to actually train users. She has a staff of
six people and three of those are technicians for the entire statewide system.
“Training is our number one priority at this point. Trying to get a standardized training
program in place,” said Helfrich. “We're finding volunteers that work for other agencies whose
boss and supervisors have said that they're going to allow them to commit their time to do this.
But the people that love this system, they love it and they're willing to do it. And then we also
work with the Office of Emergency Communications, which is funded through Homeland
Security, and they provide us technical assistance. We have asked for the assistance to perform a
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state-wide communications exercise. It's on our list of things to do. It was deferred. We're going
to try to get it back in play this year,” she said.107 While supporters of MSWIN agree it’s a
potentially reliable system, it’s unclear who will pay for the much-needed training.
“The entity that's going to pay for it is going to be the Federal Homeland Security
through the Office of Emergency Communications,” said Helfrich. “So we're working with them.
Now, it may be that if that doesn't come through, we'll sit down with MEMA and some other
folks and we'll get something put together. But the WCC alone can't do it.”108
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BARRIERS TO ENTRY FOR MSWIN USERS
While there are users in every county in Mississippi for the MSWIN, acquiring those
users isn’t always easy for the WCC. There are a number of factors that perpetually keep people
from wanting to join it despite the interoperability features it offers. The costs of P-25 radios,
fear of a user fee, fear-mongering from other radio network competitors, and losing local control
are all barriers to entry the WCC has to overcome repetitively to bring users onto the system.
“Some of the smallest counties in the state, their biggest hurdle is buying radios,”
Hancock County EMA Deputy Director, John Albert Evans said. “If they’ve been on an older
system for years, you can buy an older radio for $500 but that’s just a drop in the bucket for the
[newer models]. If people swap radio systems, they usually have to purchase different radios.
That’s not cheap.”109
According to the WCC, the least expensive that P-25 radios are selling currently are
about $1,000 each. Helfrich said radios can cost as much as $7,000 each. “It depends on who
you're buying it from, and what all bells and whistles you want,” she said.110 For the mobile
radios that are installed in vehicles, Buffington said those run a minimum of $1,500 and go up
from there. “Radios for MSWIN, because they are a P-25 technology, will cost a little more than
an older technology,” Helfrich said.111
Current Jackson County EMA Director Earl Etheridge said, “A number of the radios in
the city departments are not digital, they are analog. MSWIN is digital. We have a lot of radios
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in the county that are also digital. A lot of people don’t want to pay the cost to go from analog to
digital, like the volunteer fire departments. You’re going from an $1,800 radio to a $3,000-plus
radio. We can only afford to do so much.”112
Evans, whose county just came on the MSWIN, said, “The radios that we bought, on the
lower-end, you’re going to spend around $2,000 when you buy the spare battery, charger, and
the lapel-microphone.”113
Smithson said, “It’s a big, upfront cost. So a lot of the municipalities might have to do a
bond issue, or something like that to be able to afford $2 or $3 million dollars of a new radio
system. But once you have it, it’s fantastic.”114 Even with that high upfront cost, he said that’s
still sometimes much lower that what some counties are paying currently. “Hinds County just
same on the MSWIN just last month and it was a big, big racket. Their contract was $1 million a
month to keep the Hinds County-Jackson system up. $12 million dollars a year to keep up the
old, traditional system,” he said.115
Additionally, local authorities fear losing local control of their emergency
communication system to the state. It’s not uncommon to see a news article from time-to-time
how about how some state is lamenting the fact of federal over reach and control—the same
logic is applied here with local and state control.116
“Nobody wants to be dictated to by MSWIN,” Etheridge said. “We already have our own
system that we paid several million dollars for. We had it before MSWIN came into
existence.”117
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Current Jackson County EMA Director Brian Adam said, “I don’t think [potential users]
understand it. They think that when you join MSWIN they take over your system. That’s not
true. You make a mutual agreement on what you and MSWIN want. They think MSWIN is
going in there and completely taking over their system. And to be honest, that was one of the
reasons for us, until we understood what it was about, why we were hesitant.”118
“It’s about a feeling of losing control. Normally, once we have the ability to have a
conversation, they tend to understand that we don’t want control over the local system,” Helfrich
explained. “We just give them all of the information and let them handle it. We don’t want to
handle it for them.”119
Buffington expanded, “Not only is there no will, but there is no capability to run
everything for everybody. The technology works like this—you tell us that you want to join and
then you buy your radios. We don’t care how many you buy. We give you a bracket of radio
I.D.’s and you invest in the necessary equipment that can set that up and manage it, and we’re
done. You manage your dispatch and collection of radios, and we manage the network. We just
want to give them the capability to talk to everyone else.”120
In regards to the local, terrestrial networks that every county has always used, old habits
die hard for some—and sometimes old contracts also. Over the course of decades, relationships
between counties decision-makers and local vendors have naturally grown. These are the local
companies that service the towers, receivers, and sell the equipment also. When it comes to
switching over to the MSWIN, those local contractors and other interested parties don’t go
quietly into the night when millions of dollars are at stake.
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“A lot of the real money is in the county systems, for the county sheriff, the police
department, and all that,” Smithson explained. “It’s in the repeaters and all of the closet stuff that
allows one radio to talk to another radio. Because they are not line-of-sight. They go through a
tower network, and then through a series of repeaters. It just depends on who puts the repeaters
in and makes all the money. It’s a private contractor, not Motorola (who has the state contract).
It’s anyone who might have a contract with a municipality.”121
“Let’s say if you’re in County XYZ, the county radio system might be a Motorola
system, but it’s maintained by ‘Bill Smith Communications’. He’s got the contract, he’s keeping
the system up, and he’s making his money, and we’re really talking millions of dollars,” said
Smithson.122 One could see why misinformation and fear-mongering to prospective users from
contractors could be present.
“It’s just how public safety has always done business. They have their vendors,” said
Helfrich. “Usually, there are a lot of rumors that are not even true.”123
Adam agrees that the familiarity with the local contractors and fear is a reason people are
hesitant also. “We had a company in Hancock County that was a consultant for us and the
problem we had with them was they were partial to another radio vendor, and not Motorola,
whom we had,” he stated. “We really never got any good info from them. Once we got rid of
them, we were able to sit down with the WCC to really get the info we needed.”124
Smithson echoed that sentiment. “You might be the President of the County Board of
Supervisors, and your nephew could own the communications company. The way the law works
right now is the counties maintain their own communications systems up. When the newer
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systems come in, then the county, or the city, will have to pony up the money to buy new radios.
But only radios. So the contractor could lose out on the [maintenance] contract,” he said.125
Millions of dollars are on the line with these maintenance contracts for networks all
across the state of Mississippi, so it’s not a surprise when misinformation is spread by
financially-interested parties. The WCC said they do their best to combat it when speaking to
potential users.
Lastly, the fear of a user fee a to be on the MSWIN at some point in the future is a big
barrier-to-entry for prospective entities. “That’s been probably the biggest fear. Once you get
past that, it’s control. And once you get past control, it’s the price of the equipment,” said
Buffington.126
The fear of a user fee stems from the legislation that created the WCC where it is written
that a user fee is permitted to be charge by the WCC, according to Smithson. “Here’s the deal,
it’s fear-mongering,” he said. “The legislature has promised that they will never enact user fees.
But they haven’t taken the language out of the original bill that created the wireless commission.
It was not taken out in 2012. But the Governor, the Lt. Governor, and the Speaker have all said
that we will never have user fees for MSWIN. But the language is actually still in there. So,
that’s fear-mongering, because we have so many of these proprietary radio systems and the
vendors are out there telling the counties ‘You don’t want to do this, because one day they are
going to charge you user fees.’”127
Buffington said, “We’ve never had a fee, we have the authority to charge a fee, but we
never will. People over in legislature have come out and that there will never be a local user fee
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for the service. Of course, that means that legislation has to fund the maintenance of MSWIN.
It’s still not codified, but if it was then our jobs would be easier.”128
State Senate President Pro Tempore Terry C. Burton, a Republican from Newton, went
on the record in September 2014 at a WCC meeting to ease fears that a user fee would ever
assessed for MSWIN. “There is no flavor in the legislature for fees at the local level. Zero. Nada.
None,” he said.129 Representative Scott DeLano, of Harrison County on the Gulf Coast, echoed
the same feelings at the meeting.
Regardless, Local EMA directors on the Mississippi Gulf Coast still don’t have an easy
feeling. They relayed their qualms about a potential user fee. Adam stated, “In the beginning,
that was one of our biggest hesitations—the user fee. The two biggest concerns for us were the
user fee and what if the system goes away?”130
Etheridge said, “Let’s say some of these smaller counties that don’t have a lot of money
and they’re relying on MSWIN, why would you put an undue burden on them? Why would we
want to pay $200 per radio? Between my office and volunteer fire departments, we probably
have close to 300 radios.”131 $200 is the fee that was initially tossed around by the legislature.
Current Harrison County EMA Direct Rupert Lacy said, “If you only have X amount of
dollars to spend a year and now they kick that fee in there, where are you going to find your
money at?”132
Helfrich said they haven’t been able to get the user fee language revised. “It semi-passed
last year, ‘No state agency can charge another state agency a fee.’ It’s just that the locals want a
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provision stating that they won’t be charged. I think they want language in the code that says
local entities will not be charged a user fee.”133
When referring to the policy of state agencies not charging other state agencies fees,
Buffington added, “Right now, it is just a policy, not a code.”134
“That scares everybody to death. I’m not going to lie about that. Here we are and we are
on this MSWIN system and the next thing we know we’re going to have to put into [more
money] into our budget,” said Lacy. “That’s a heavy concern.”135
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WHO ON THE MISSISSIPPI GULF COAST IS ON MSWIN?
All 82 counties in Mississippi have the capacity to be on MSWIN. That means there is
tower coverage that reaches into every county in the state, and in most instances those towers
overlap for redundancy. Participation on MSWIN in each of the counties varies greatly. All 82
counties, at the very least, have their local EMA that has a P-25 radio that makes them MSWINcapable. For some counties, like Choctaw County in north Mississippi, the only MSWINcapable radio in the whole county is the one at the local EMA. For others, like Bolivar County in
the Mississippi Delta, they have over a dozen local departments and municipalities that are all on
MSWIN.
The WCC has three classifications for departments or municipalities around the state.
They’re either on MSWIN completely, they have interoperability with MSWIN, or they have no
way of communicating on MSWIN. To be completely on the network means they use the
MSWIN receivers exclusively for emergency communications. Some of the entities in this
category have also brought their own updated towers and integrated them into the existing
MSWIN system of towers. “That’s the best-case scenario for us if someone already has upgraded
towers that are capable of integrating into the MSWIN network,” said Buffington.136
The entities that fall into the interoperability category are departments and municipalities
that have their own local, terrestrial radio systems but they have radios that are P-25 capable and
have MSWIN capability by switching to the MSWIN channels. At a minimum, the WCC pushes
for interoperability if entities won’t come completely on to MSWIN.
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The WCC has procurement authority for all emergency communications in the state that
are over $100,000. In the telecommunications industry that’s not a lot of money. So when a
county’s local, terrestrial system is at the end of its life, the WCC has final approval over what
the county purchases—a new local system or persuades them to come on to MSWIN. It’s
common that counties do want to stay with a local system for many of the reasons listed above.
“The commission does compel them to, at least, buy radios with units that can change channels
from theirs to the state’s (MSWIN). Any new radio-related purchases by the locals within the last
four or five years have to be MSWIN compatible,” said Buffington. “We require the
interoperability so the radios that they purchase have the capability to operate on their system
and MSWIN.”137
The last MSWIN category is simply for entities that have no way to communicate on
MSWIN. This is any department or municipality that uses their local, terrestrial system that
doesn’t have interoperable P-25 radios.
On the Mississippi Gulf Coast, where sooner or later another hurricane will stress
communication abilities again, it’s a mixture of MSWIN participation. For the lower-three
counties that border the gulf, Buffington explained, “Hancock County is on [MSWIN], and they
couldn’t be any better. Harrison County has their own system, but most of their radios are
interoperable. Jackson County has their own system, and they have radios that are
interoperable.”138
Hancock County falls into the first category of completely relying on MSWIN for their
emergency communication and Harrison and Jackson counties have the interoperability with
their local, terrestrial systems because some of their radios are P-25 capable. In regards to
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Harrison and Jackson counties Buffington said, “We are working toward them upgrading to
come on MSWIN the next time that they upgrade. I think they are both close to end-of-life, but it
could take another year or so. Even though it’s near end-of-life, their radios can still operate on
MSWIN. Let’s just say that their system went down today, they’ve still got MSWIN coverage. If
their radios can interoperate, they still have some form of coverage.”139
In Harrison County, all five major cities in the county, Biloxi, Gulfport, D’Iberville, Pass
Christian, and Long Beach all have their police and fire departments interoperable with MSWIN.
The county sheriff and fire departments also have interoperability along with their EMA.
In Jackson County, the least MSWIN-operable county on the coast, the four major cities
of Pascagoula, Gautier, Moss Point, and Ocean Springs all have their fire departments MSWIN
interoperable along with their EMA. None of the police departments are interoperable and
neither is the county sheriff department.
In Hancock County, as Buffington said, they’re completely on MSWIN and even the
Hancock County School District and the Bay St. Louis/ Waveland School District are on the
network. The three counties of Pearl River, Stone, and George, which are all one county
removed from the coast, have most all of their police and fire departments with MSWIN
interoperability along with each of their EMAs.
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MISSISSIPPI GULF COAST EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT AGENCY
DETRACTORS AND SUPPORTS OF MSWIN
MSWIN has its detractors and supporters all over the state and that’s no different on the
Mississippi Gulf Coast. Some think it’s a network that’s improved their emergency
communication capabilities while others would rather continue with the status quo.
It’s not uncommon for the WCC and potential users to not see eye-to eye. When referring
to his local, terrestrial communication system Etheridge explained, “It’s meeting our needs here
in the county so we have no need to join the statewide [MSWIN] system since we already have
our own.”140 When asked what Jackson County would do in the event that local towers and
receivers were damaged during another hurricane Etheridge said they would bring in portable
towers to back up their system. Also, with their interoperable radios they could still switch over
to the MSWIN channels to be able to communicate statewide.
He also lamented costs associated with MSWIN saying, “The citizens of this county are
already paying for our local system. So why would we want to go out and pay for some other
system when we’re already paying for ours?”141 The WCC states no municipalities are paying to
be on MSWIN currently with users fees and never have—the cost of the radios, which Jackson
County already has many of, is the only cost to the users. The Jackson County emergency
communications system was built in the 1990s.
Etheridge isn’t the only one on the Mississippi Gulf Coast that has those sentiments about
parts of MSWIN. Lacy, in Harrison County, has his thoughts. “The biggest part is service. We
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have technicians onboard and if we get an alarm on our system we are on it in a heartbeat. We
send our tech out there and we don’t have to wait two days for someone to come out of Jackson
to work on the system,” said Lacy.142
He also claimed that their local, terrestrial system has more coverage in Harrison County
than MSWIN does. “We have 95 percent handheld radio coverage in Harrison County. We are
lucky to get 95 percent vehicle coverage with MSWIN,” Lacy stated. “Hancock is in the process
of changing over and they’re handing over another two towers to build in some redundancy. But
until everybody does that you really don’t get a lot of coverage. In a life-threatening situation
that’s really important.”143
Feelings towards MSWIN on the Gulf Coast aren’t all negative though. As mentioned,
Hancock County has come completely onto the network and is pleased with the outcome. “We
have some areas in the north end of the county that had some bad spots where we couldn’t really
get back to dispatch with. After we studied the MSWIN situation, we felt it was just the right
thing to do for our county,” said Adam. “Not only did it help MSWIN being able to use our
towers, it helped us get better coverage in the north part of the county because of their
towers.”144 Adam said that the number one factor for Hancock County coming onto MSWIN was
“coverability.”
Earlier he spoke on the hesitancy that Hancock County had at first, just like the other
counties in his area, but eventually realized MSWIN was the right fit for them. “It doesn’t matter
what system you’re on, if someone can give me a better system than what we have, and do it
better, then we wouldn’t hesitate to switch,” he explained.145
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Now Hancock County won’t only be reliant on the communication mediums they had in
2005 during Hurricane Katrina, according to Evans. “We can talk to whoever we need to,
whenever we need to and keep communications going. We won’t be relying on a cell phone
because we have another way to talk,” he said.146
Summing up their move to MSWIN Adam said, “It took us a while to realize the value of
MSWIN and we at this point have no regrets of going on it.”147
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MSWIN FUNDING AND PUBLIC/PRIVATE PARTNERSHIP
To build out MSWIN the State of Mississippi used a number of revenue sources. “For the
build, we had federal grants. We had about $15 million in state bond funds and $150 million to
build out the initial sites. And then we had another $50 million that came to us through the
federal BTOP Program—about $200 million in federal money total,” said Helfrich.148
The WCC incurs a plethora of expenses every year that’s paid of out general fund
appropriations from the Mississippi Legislature each year. Annually, MSWIN costs millions of
dollars to maintain the towers and equipment to keep it running. The WCC maintains their own
MSWIN towers but if an entity, like Rankin County recently for example, brings some of their
own towers onto the network they still maintain them locally.
“It’s not just maintenance. Some of the towers we don't own, so we have to pay tower
leases,” Helfrich said describing the costs. “Towers in the northern part of the state, we do own,
but we have to pay land leases. Out of our budget request, I think we've been getting around
$10.6 million a year. Over 90 percent every year is contractual. So there’s nothing administration
about it. It's tower rent, land rent, system maintenance, site maintenance, some contractual
services, but there's just not a lot of fluff there. The tower leases are about $4.5 million
[annually].”149
When asked if a $10.6 million appropriation is “proper funding” to keep MSWIN
operable and running as best it can Helfrich replied, “No, we need more. Our budget request is
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usually right around $12 million but we could probably live at about $11 million, but we have to
get by with $10.6 million. When I say live at $11 million, it's not comfortably.”150
“I was over at DPS before I came over here, and maybe you don't buy cars this year, or
maybe you don't buy uniforms. Maybe you don't buy a gun,” Buffington said, speaking to
budgeting decisions. “But how do you not pay the electric bill? Or how do you not pay the
ground rent for the property of the tower you're on? Some of the towers where we have money
are leased. How do you not pay that?”151
Helfrich echoed, “I have $600,000 in salaries, $100,000 in commodities, and $100,000 in
equipment. Everything else goes to keep the system going. We haven't bought a vehicle since
2008. Travel last year we spent $1,000 on travel. Because we don't have any money. So where
we get hurt, because we can't not pay the bills to keep the system operational, we get hurt in our
own technical people going to training to know what they're supposed to be doing, providing
training programs for end users, that's where we cut.”152
For the State of Mississippi fiscal year 2017, the WCC funding was cut along with most
other state agencies. “This year we got cut. So we're down to $9 million [appropriation] this
year,” Helfrich explained. “We simply can't pay our bills with $9 million. So we are at a point
now that we're going to have to go to the legislature and explain. I mean your choice is to keep it
on or turn it off. But providing public safety to your citizens is a function of government.”153 The
actual total funding the WCC will receive from the Mississippi Legislature is $9.32 million.154
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To sum up the financial situation Helfrich said, “We're resubmitting a $1.4 million deficit
request. If we don't get a deficit request, we're going to shut it down. We don't have a choice. No
one's going to keep the electricity going if we don't pay our bills. Tower companies, they don't
let you just sit on their towers. When you don't pay them rent, they'll kick us off. The land lease
is, the way it typically works if you don't pay them, they can take over control of your tower
from you. So we're just not in a position to not pay bills.”155
And the company that all of the money is going to for maintenance contracts is Motorola.
They’re the big player in the two-way radio telecommunications industry having an estimated 80
percent of the market as recently as 2014.156 “Motorola was selected in 2007 to be the vendor to
deploy the MSWIN system. The system is operated by the WCC in conjunction with Motorola
as the contracted vendor for system monitoring and maintenance,” said Helfrich.157
She elaborated, “A Request for Proposal (RFP) was released by the Mississippi
Department of Information Technology Services (ITS), the contracting agent for the WCC, in
March 2006. In November, both ITS and the WCC approved the selection of Motorola as the
lowest and best vendor responding to RFP 3429 to provide a turnkey statewide wireless voice
and data capable infrastructure system. The contract was executed in June 2007.”
As for the two companies who sent in bids Helfrich said, “There were two vendors that
responded to the RFP – M/A - Com and Motorola. The difference in the 15-year life cycle costs
was approximately $90M.” Motorola had bid $221 million and underbid M/A-Com by $90
million to win the contract.
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The contract with Motorola is set to expire in June 2017 but the WCC says that the
MSWIN project isn’t finalized in regards to getting full coverage around the state, and it’s likely
to extend the Motorola contract to allow the state to complete the project.
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COMPARING MSWIN TO WIRELESS INFORMATION NETWORKS IN REGIONAL
STATES
MSWIN is not the only statewide emergency communication network in the southeast or
the rest of the country. The WCC claims it’s the most advanced system of its kind in the United
States and only Michigan is in the process of upgraded to the level of MSWIN.158 In the years
following Hurricane Katrina a few other states were in the process of building out their own
versions of MSWIN. Both Arkansas and Louisiana have systems that are similar in nature to
MSWIN.
The Arkansas Wireless Information Network (AWIN) is very similar to MSWIN in
regards to technology and how it’s built out with the towers. It is a microwave-based system that
uses the same P-25 radios that MSWIN users must buy from any number of vendors. Again, a
microwave-based system doesn’t rely on phone lines to transmit messages between users.
Microwave-based systems use “line of sight” to connect tower-to-tower.159
To pay for AWIN and to get it started, Penny Rubow, Arkansas Wireless Information
Network Program Director said, “In 2004 we were able to work with a [Federal] Homeland
Security grant, bond money, and a little bit of general revenue funds. I believe the cost was right
at $73 million to build out AWIN. A big part of that went to purchase radios.”160 Arkansas was
able to convert an older, dated-network from decades ago into what is now known as AWIN,
which kept the cost lower than what it took to completely build out MSWIN from scratch.
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A portion of that $73 million total actually went towards buying P-25 radios. “Our
governor at the time required all the 75 EMA jurisdictions in Arkansas to purchase enough
radios to put them in service in the system. So that means they had their own local radios but
they also had radios on the AWIN system so they could communicate with their neighboring
towns and counties,” said Rubow.161
“When we went live with the AWIN system in October 2006, we probably had 3,000
users,” she said. “In 2007, early in the year, we had some really bad weather and after that we
saw more people that wanted to be on AWIN. We’ve had pretty steady growth since that
point.”162 Currently AWIN has around 30,000 users, just like MSWIN, and has 132 towers
around the state.163
When AWIN first came online, not everyone was onboard with joining it. “There were a
lot of people that were skeptical,” stated Rubow. “They didn’t think it would work.”164 She
described that many of the barriers-to-entry that the WCC deals with in regards to MSWIN are
the exact same. “It’s funny how similar our barriers to entry are [with Mississippi.] We hear a lot
of complaints about the cost of the radio. For a while we had a lot of concern about big brother
looking over our shoulder and what we’ve tried to do is help people understand that once you’re
on the system we will stay out of the way,” she explained.165
AWIN doesn’t have a user fee to be on the network but each municipality or department
that comes on it has some sort of non-monetary contribution they must bring to the table. Rubow
stated, “What we do is whenever a new user comes on the system, depending on their level of
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use, we have a matrix we use to determine a contribution level from them. It might be bringing
their existing towers to the system. In other deals it might be providing some spare equipment.
We have one deal where a county maintains the roads out to their two tower sites. We try to
work with the user and figure out the best way to get them on the system. It’s not a monetary
compensation.”166 Because parts of Arkansas have mountainous terrain, a microwave-based “line
of sight” system can be challenging so any time that a municipality can bring their own towers
online with AWIN it’s a big help for coverage.
Like MSWIN, these municipalities fall into three categories for AWIN: those who solely
rely on the network, those who have their own local network but have interoperability with
AWIN because they have P-25 radios, and lastly those who have their own local network but
don’t have P-25 radios who can’t communicate at all on AWIN.
Like Mississippi, Arkansas has a contract with Motorola to maintain their towers and
equipment. “The way our state laws are written, maintenance contracts don’t have to be bid,”
Rubow explained. “We did bid it once before but the only response we got was for someone who
wanted to handle the helpdesk answering the phones and we didn’t need that, so we’ve just stuck
with Motorola.”167
To help users get acclimated to using AWIN, the State of Arkansas does have training
when requested—something that Mississippi doesn’t currently offer directly from the WCC.
“We went through a period of time when we didn’t have anyone to do training and we suffered.
So what we do now is that we have on-demand training. If someone comes on the system and
calls and says they need training we will send someone up to do the training,” said Rubow.168
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The State of Louisiana also has its own system called the Louisiana Wireless Information
Network. It is claimed to be the largest statewide radio system in the country based on users,
which total 84,000.169 Travis Johnson, Louisiana Interoperability Program Manager, said,
“LWIN is a land-mobile radio network. It covers 95 percent of the state with portable, handheld
coverage. The coverage in vehicle radios is even better because those are stronger transmitters.
The real benefit of the system is that there are about 84,000 users on the system. That’s actually
the thing that people don’t realize off the bat. That’s why it’s useful.”170
Johnson continued, “There’s 135 tower sites throughout the state and the state takes care
of all of the tower site maintenance and pay for them—so all the end users have to buy is the user
equipment which is P-25 radios.”171
Explaining the similar MSWIN-like qualities of the network he said, “What is does allow
you to do, since we have shared talk groups, we can take a firefighter from one corner of the
state and pair him up with a deputy from another corner of the state, and they can communicate
with the normal radios they use every single day.”172 He said 70 percent of the users on LWIN
are local users. In 2015, there were 12 million push-to-talk transmissions per month on LWIN.173
The Louisiana Statewide Interoperable Executive Committee, who is tasked with
overseeing LWIN, just like the WCC does in Mississippi, was created in 2008.174 To build it out
the State of Louisiana used a combination of funds. “There were lots of [federal] grants funding
after Katrina. [The costs] were federal, state, and local because some of the infrastructure was
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stuff that was already paid for by the parishes. For example, a parish putting up their own
infrastructure because they didn’t have the coverage they needed,” Johnson explained.175
When Johnson was told the barriers-to-entry that the WCC has to overcome he agreed
with Rubow that they’re similar in Louisiana. “Those are the exact barriers-to-entry that we have
here,” he said. “The cost of the radios, if you are a local volunteer fire department and have five
or six people and you’re used to buying $300 radios, it’s two or three times that price they would
pay [to be on LWIN]. That’s definitely a barrier-to-entry.”176
The worry of user fees is not something that Louisiana has had to overcome to get people
to sign up though. “As far as the user fees, we’ve never had user fees and it doesn’t say anything
about user fees in our documentation so that helps us out a little bit. The local control and the
user fee issue are combined here in Louisiana,” said Johnson. “Because our initial proposed
legislation to create our statewide interoperability executive committee, which is like the WCC
in Mississippi, what we did was that we floated it to the users and it was going to be made up of
50 percent state agencies and 50 percent local users. They came back and said ‘If you want us to
participate in this we’re going to be the majority of users and we should have the majority on the
committee’ so they went back and changed the legislation.”177 Having the local users make up
the majority of the governing body that make fiscal decisions regarding LWIN eased many of the
locals’ concerns.
“The way it’s set up now is we have five state agencies, six are first responder
associations, and the other nine are the nine Governor’s Office of Homeland Security and
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Emergency Preparedness regions in Louisiana,” Johnson explained. “So 15 of the 20 members
that would control user fees are made up of users themselves. They now run it.”178
In Mississippi, the WCC is the equivalent of the SIEC in Louisiana and it has 16
members on the WCC commission. Additionally, there are also eight legislators on an advisory
board for the WCC. Of the 16 commission members, 11 are executive directors of state agencies.
The remaining five are from associations that have local interest at heart like the Mississippi
Association of Supervisors or the Mississippi Fire Chief’s Association. The balance of the
commission leans heavily toward state interest if who each member works for is the deciding
factor.
Louisiana also has users that fall into the same three interoperability categories as
Mississippi and Arkansas. For the users in Louisiana that aren’t able to talk on LWIN at all, the
state government has a cache of radios they can disperse to local users in times of emergency.
One of the key differences in Mississippi and Arkansas versus Louisiana is that LWIN
uses phone lines to facilitate the transmission of communication. “One of the challenges we had
to build out the system with the speed we did and the coverage we did was that we had to use T1
lines for our backhaul,” said Johnson. “Where on the MSWIN system, they use microwavebackhaul. A microwave backhaul is much more reliable. There’s a lot more outages with the T1
backhaul.”179 In the telecommunication industry, backhaul refers to everything between the
cellular/microwave tower and the core that processes all the traffic—it’s everything in
between.180
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This means if the phone lines go down during a hurricane or storm then LWIN is
rendered useless where the phones are down—luckily for LWIN the power grid and the phone
lines are not interconnected. The phone lines supply their own power, but it’s still a potential
chink in the armor for LWIN. “[We rely on] a copper phone line or a fiber optic line that’s buried
under the ground which is subject to flooding. Your microwave system is not,” said Johnson.181
In regards to when the power grid goes down, each of the LWIN towers do have diesel
generators as a backup power source.
The State of Louisiana does have training available to users who need it. “There’s not
automatic training but the Governor’s Office of Homeland Security and Emergency
Preparedness has the Office of Interoperability who is available to do that training for [users],”
Johnson explained. “Plus we do statewide communication exercises every year. It’s not
specifically LWIN exercises, but we do throw situations in where if your LWIN towers isn’t
working what would you do.”182
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CONCLUSION
MSWIN has been fully operational since 2009 statewide and has accumulated around
30,000 users in all 82 counties in Mississippi. It’s a network that has supporters and detractors.
There are clearly some barriers-to-entry that are present and explained by the WCC and some of
them are self-inflicted like the user fee in legislation. Doing away with the user fee legislation
would cut out one of the reasons for hesitation for local municipalities. Others like the cost of
radios, fear-mongering, and municipalities not wanting to give up local control is harder to
combat and is something the WCC will likely always contend with.
The funding for MSWIN looms as the WCC’s, and potentially the citizens of
Mississippi’s, biggest problem currently facing it. It equates to spending a lot of money to buy
the nicest vehicle on the car lot but only allocating just the bare minimum in funds each year to
keep it cranked and able to take you from one place to the other. As mentioned, this is a problem
for almost every other state agency also that’s faced cutbacks in the last year as revenue was
slow. It’s a dilemma of funding something that one might not see as essential day-to-day as roads
and bridges, and it isn’t a sexy political win to go back and tell constituents that you fully-funded
MSWIN unless one has just had a major emergency in their district. Keeping MSWIN funded at
a proper level for maintenance and training is imperative for citizens of the Mississippi Gulf
Coast that will always be at a greater risk of a widespread natural disaster.
Researching the private telecommunication companies in Mississippi that provide cell
phone service on the Mississippi Gulf Coast is a possibility for future research. They are 50
percent of the equation for residents when a disaster strikes and those citizens are trying to access
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loved ones and potential life-saving information through social media or websites on their smart
phones. Additionally, I think there is an opportunity for further research into how the State of
Mississippi and other local emergency agencies use or don’t use social media to reach people in
times of crisis. Many people use social media as one of their only sources of news and whether
or not potential life-saving information is being distributed on these channels presents an
opportunity for more research.
As evidenced, the State of Mississippi wasn’t the only state to have major problems
during Hurricane Katrina with emergency communications—nor are they the only state to have
implemented their own version of a potential solution for the next hurricane. The State of
Louisiana has built out its own version of MSWIN, that admittedly, they say has potential
problems with the way it’s built. No system is perfect and neither is MSWIN.
The WCC claims that MSWIN is the most technologically advanced emergency
interoperable communication system of any state in the nation. For the municipalities on
MSWIN, the technology and infrastructure of it all across the state and on the Mississippi Gulf
Coast has first responders undoubtedly more prepared for the next hurricane than in 2005.
Whether one chalks that up to technology naturally improving for 11 years, to the State of
Mississippi putting together a quarter billion-dollar network, or both is for each person to decide.
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